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Abstract 
The study analyses the economic consequences of changes in the local bank presence. 
Using a unique dataset of banks, firms, and counties in Poland over the period 2009-2014, 
we show that changes in local banking that increase the role of the relationship banking 
model are associated with improvements in local labour markets and easier access of 
SMEs to bank debt. Moreover, radical changes in the ownership structure of large 
commercial banks result in a more rapid new firm creation. Finally, we document that 
young companies’ performance is more sensitive to the instability of local banking 
markets. 
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The financial crisis of 2008 changed the global banking landscape. Banks hit by the 
crisis were nationalized or forced to merge or significantly restructure their activities. Both 
firms and citizens experienced the repercussions of those changes. The impact of the financial 
crisis on bank relationships and credit for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has been 
widely addressed in the literature. Researchers used both country-level data (for example, 
Berger, Cerqueiro, and Fabias Penas, 2015, for the USA; Kremp and Sevestre, 2013, for France; 
Tsurata, 2015, for Japan) and cross-country data (for example, Popov and Udell, 2012 for 14 
Central and Eastern European countries). The regional and local effects of the crisis, including 
changes in the banking markets, attracted, so far, less attention. Our study tries to fill in this gap 
in the literature. 
To examine the local repercussions of crisis-induced modifications in the banking 
sector, we use data from Poland from 2009 to 2014. We focus on three types of changes in the 
local bank presence. First, we study the dynamics of bank branch networks within local banking 
markets. Second, we investigate the changes in the number of banks. Finally, we analyse the 
modifications of bank ownership structures within local banking markets. We investigate local 
changes at the county level1. We assess the effects of instability in local banking markets from 
the perspective of local economic activity and firms’ performance. Consequently, our dataset 
combines information on a county’s economic situation, local firms’ financial characteristics, 
and bank branch locations. 
When studying the impact of changes in the local bank presence on economic activity 
and firms’ performance, an endogeneity problem arises. On the one hand, the modifications in 
the number and structure of banks or branches within a county may influence local economic 
                                                 
1 We provide more information on counties in Poland in Section 3. 
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indicators and companies’ performance. On the other hand, banks’ decisions to enter or exit 
local banking markets depend, to some extent, on the local economic situation and local firms’ 
perspectives. Therefore, in this study, we use the GMM-SYS style estimation to address the 
endogeneity concerns directly. 
In general terms, our empirical evidence indicates that different types of instability in 
the local bank presence have measurable economic repercussions. We find that bank branch 
expansion, regardless of the bank type, exerted a positive and direct influence on the local 
labour market. In line with the previous findings by Hasan, Jackowicz, Kowalewski, Kozłowski 
(2014), we show that changes that strengthen the position of local cooperative banks and 
presumably privilege the use of the relationship banking model had positive consequences not 
only on employment but also on SMEs’ access to debt and investment. In contrast, the increase 
in the number of large commercial banks within local markets, that probably stimulates the 
application of the transactional banking model, was associated with slower long-term debt 
growth for SMEs. The increased competition associated to a larger number of banks present in 
local banking markets lowered the financial costs incurred by SMEs. Only the appearance of 
new, usually stronger, more aggressive owners of large commercial banks stimulated the firm 
creation process. Young companies demonstrated to be more sensitive to the instability of local 
banking markets than mature firms. For example, the negative influence of large commercial 
banks’ entries on the long-term debt growth ratios was stronger for SMEs that were established 
in the previous five years. However, the same group of SMEs benefited the most from the 
increased number of cooperative banks within a county in terms of reduced financial costs. 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in three aspects. First, we use a unique 
dataset that allows us to trace different types of changes in the local bank presence and to assess 
their influence on local economic activity in the post-crisis period. Second, our study adds to 
the relatively small number of studies that address SMEs’ performance drivers in emerging 
IESEG Working Paper Series 2017-ACF-01 
4 
 
economies, in general, and in Central European (CE) countries in particular. Third, and most 
importantly, we document that changes in the local bank presence are an additional, 
independent, statistically significant, and economically relevant factor that shapes local 
economic activity and the performance of local firms. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant 
literature and formulate our research hypotheses. In Section 3, we present our empirical 
strategy, data, and econometric models. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 
reports the concluding remarks and policy implications. 
2 Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
There are three main strands in the banking literature related to our research: branching 
deregulation, relationship lending, and the effects of bank consolidation on SME lending. We 
briefly review the existing literature and introduce four hypotheses regarding the consequences 
of the instability of local banking markets on local economic activity and SMEs’ performance. 
The first strand of the literature concentrates on the positive effects of deregulation of 
branching laws on the banking industry and the economy. Most studies focus on the USA, 
where, from the 1970s through the 1990s, some states have removed restrictions on intrastate 
branching. In this respect, the USA provided an ideal ground for testing the effects of the 
intensified bank competition. Jayaratne and Strahan (1997) report that the banking industry 
became significantly more efficient after the deregulation of the intrastate branching. They find 
that the state averages for operating expenses and loan losses fell, and that much of these 
improvements were passed on to borrowers in the form of lower interest rates. Rice and Strahan 
(2010) confirm that the cost of credit is lower in states that are open to interstate branching. 
Moreover, they show that small firms are more likely to borrow from banks where branching 
is less restricted. Strahan (2003) provides a comprehensive review of the available evidence in 
favour of the benefits of deregulation. 
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In addition, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that GDP and income growth rates 
increased in the deregulated states. Beck, Levine, Levkov (2010) provided an evaluation of the 
impact of branch deregulation on the distribution of income in the US economy. They report 
that removing restrictions on intrastate bank branching reduced inequality by boosting incomes 
in the lower portion of the income distribution. They suggest three possible channels linking 
bank performance and income distribution. The first is related to studies showing that credit 
market imperfections prevent the poor from borrowing to invest more in education, which 
hinders their access to higher paying jobs (Galor and Zeira, 1993). The second explanation is 
based on the results of Benerjee and Newman (1993) and focuses on the ability of the poor to 
become entrepreneurs. The last reason relies on the response of companies to lower interest 
rates, which encourage firms to substitute capital for labour. Consequently, we assume that the 
development of local bank branch networks positively affects local economic activity, both 
directly, through job creation, and indirectly, through factors related to the intensified 
competition and the improvement of lending conditions. However, the opposite effect, 
particularly in the case of the local labour market, is also conceivable as the increased 
competition may also force banks to lay off workers and the improved access to bank loans 
may encourage firms to invest in less labour-intensive technologies. Therefore, we verify the 
following hypothesis:  
H1: The development of local bank branch networks is beneficial to the overall 
economic activity, in particular to the local labour market. 
The second strand of the literature concentrates on relationship banking. The existing 
theoretical and empirical research suggests that small local banks may have an advantage in 
providing loans to SMEs. The benefit may result from relationship lending, which is 
characterized by close monitoring, re-negotiability, and lengthy contractual agreements (Berlin 
and Mester, 1998). DeYoung (2002) argues that community banks have a comparative 
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advantage over larger banks in forming relationships with lenders, as they have permanent 
contact with local economic players. They may also base the loan granting process on 
information about the prospects of the local economy. Ergungor and Moulton (2011) document 
that the presence of a bank in local markets improves its credit quality assessment process. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Elsas and Krahnen (1998) show that building a close relationship 
with lenders results in a larger availability of credit. Additionally, Berger and Udell (1995) find 
that small firms with longer bank relationships pay lower interest rates and are required to 
provide less collateral. 
Berger and Udell (2002) show that large banks are less likely to extend credit to small 
businesses, especially to small firms with no credit history. Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, 
Stein (2005) add that large banks are not keen on small business lending, which relies heavily 
on soft information. In contrast, large banks prefer to lend to large firms that have well-
documented track records. Large banks may also be objectively disadvantaged in this respect, 
as their headquartered are often located at a substantial distance from potential small business 
borrowers. Strahan and Weston (1998) confirm that the presence of large banks has an adverse 
effect on small business growth. They also show that small business lending increases with 
banks growth for a while, but when a bank gets larger, lending to large firms increases 
dramatically. Finally, Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) underline that the geographical proximity 
between bank branches and clients facilitates the gathering of soft information, reducing 
problems related to asymmetric information. 
Although several studies document that large banks have an informational disadvantage 
in making loans to small business, the recent research shows that such banks have been using 
hard information-based technologies to evaluate credit application of small firms. Berger and 
Black (2011) find that lending techniques based on hard information guarantee a comparative 
advantage to large banks in lending to both small and large firms, but not to the medium-sized 
IESEG Working Paper Series 2017-ACF-01 
7 
 
companies. Nevertheless, most part of the literature supports the view that small banks have a 
comparative advantage in lending to SMEs. As a consequence, we conjecture that changes in 
the local bank presence that boost relationship banking and privilege the use of soft information 
within local banking markets have a positive impact on local economic activity. Therefore, we 
introduce the following hypothesis: 
H2: The relative strengthening of small local banks improves the local economic 
situation. 
The third strand of the relevant literature concentrates on the impact of bank 
consolidation on the credit availability for small businesses. The effect of consolidation on bank 
lending terms is a widely researched topic. Gilbert (1984) and Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan 
(1999) present an excellent literature review. A bank merger and acquisition (M&A) process 
involves changes in ownership, strategy, and bank focus. Peek and Rosengren (1995) and 
Strahan and Weston (1998) find that M&As between small banks increase small business 
lending, whereas consolidation between large banks tends to influence small business lending 
negatively. 
Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell (1998) underline the complexity of the impact of 
M&As on bank lending. They find that their negative impact on small business lending may be 
offset by changes in the lending behaviour of competitors within the same market. In line with 
their findings, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2007) suggest that M&As only lead to a 
temporary reduction in the credit supply of SMEs. Moreover, Black and Strahan (2002) find 
that consolidation increases the rate of new business incorporation. 
Summarising, consolidation in the banking industry raises concerns about the 
survivability of small banks, and, therefore, affects the credit availability for small firms. 
Consolidation among small banks seems to enhance small business lending, while the opposite 
appears to happen when large banks are involved. On the other hand, this reduction appears to 
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be offset, at least in part, by the decision of other banks within the same local markets to increase 
lending to small business by way of response. Moreover, after the 2008 crisis, the new bank 
owners were usually financially stronger and intended to pursue a more aggressive market 
strategy. Therefore, we assume in H3 that consolidation process may have a positive effect on 
local economic activity 
H3: Significant changes in the ownership of banks that are present in local markets 
have a positive impact on local economic activity. 
Young firms are more opaque, have a shorter credit history and less valuable collateral 
compared to mature companies. Consequently, their relationship with local banks may be 
crucial for their access to credit. Using data on the regional banking structure in China, Hasan, 
Kobeissi, Wang, and Zhou (2015) find a positive and significant relation between the credit 
supplied by rural banking institutions and small business development. Berger et al. (2015b) 
show that a strong presence of small banks yields to a much higher lending to start-ups in the 
US during normal times. In addition, they also find that a greater presence of small banks has a 
small positive impact on the failure rate of small opaque firms during normal times. Those 
effects were, however, reversed during the financial crisis of 2008, suggesting that small banks 
were not able to exploit their competitive advantage over large banks during a crisis period. 
These results confirm that the links between young firms and banks are of particular 
importance. Moreover, those relationships are weak when their duration is short. For these 
reasons, we believe that the performance of young SMEs is more sensitive to different forms 
of instability within local banking markets compared to large companies. Therefore, we 
introduce the following hypothesis:  
H4: The access to bank loans and investments of young SMEs is more sensitive to changes 
in the local bank presence compared to mature firms. 
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3 Empirical strategy, Data, and Models 
In this section, we provide a general description of our empirical strategy. We also 
characterize the different data sources used in this study and we describe the construction of the 
dynamic panel models. 
3.1 The Level of the Analysis 
We examine changes in local banking markets and their impact on the local economic 
situation and SMEs’ performance at the county level. In Poland, counties are intermediary units 
of administrative division between communes and voivodships. There are 380 counties in 
Poland, including 66 cities that perform county function. Their average surface is equal to 823 
square kilometres, while the average population slightly exceeds 100,000 people. The counties 
represent a convenient choice for analysing the repercussions of instability within local banking 
systems for two reasons. First, several, important economic indicators are not available for 
communes, but only for counties or voivodships. Second, Presbitero, Udell, and Zazzaro (2014) 
show that the vast majority of loans are contracted locally. Therefore, the 17 voivodships in 
Poland are too large units of the administrative division to study the economic phenomena of 
interest.  
3.2 Specificity of the Polish Banking System 
The Polish banking system is characterized by two groups of banks that compete locally. 
These groups differ substantially in their business model, organizational form, and size of 
operations. The first group of banks—the so-called commercial banks—includes large, 
distantly managed banks with nationwide branch networks, organized as joint-stock companies, 
state enterprises, or branches of foreign credit institutions. The second group comprises 
cooperative banks only, which are small local organizations covering at best several counties. 
According to data published by the Polish Financial Supervision Authority, 626 cooperative 
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banks controlled almost 7% of the banking sector assets at the end of 2015, while 65 
commercial banks were in charge of the remaining assets. However, cooperative banks offered 
their services through 4,200 branches, almost 30% of all bank branches in Poland. In the Polish 
banking sector, most commercial banks were foreign-owned. The bank assets controlled by 
foreign investors amounted to around 70% during the period of study. Popov and Udell (2012) 
find strong evidence for the international transmission of financial distress during the financial 
crisis of 2008, which resulted in a credit reduction for SMEs. In contrast, Allen, Jackowicz, 
Kowalewski, and Kozlowski (2015) show that, during the recent crisis, state-owned banks 
increased lending in Central European countries. Let us recall that small local banks also have 
a comparative advantage in producing soft information (Berger and Udell, 2002; Berger, 
Bouwman, and Kim, 2015; Liberti and Mian, 2009; Stein, 2002) and apply the relationship 
banking model (Berger and Udell, 1995; Berger et al., 2005; De Haas, Ferreira, Taci, 2010; 
Uchida. Udell, and Watanabe, 2008). Therefore, we conjecture that cooperative banks in Poland 
may play a disproportionately important role in shaping local economic activity in comparison 
to their modest share in banking sector assets, particularly after the crisis. For this reason, in 
our investigation, we differentiate between commercial banks and cooperative banks. 
3.3 An Overview of the Research Strategy 
As Figure 1 shows, the definition of a local banking market constitutes our starting 
point. We assume that county borders define local banking markets. We distinguish three 
sources of instability within local banking: the development of bank branch networks, bank 
entries to and exits from local banking markets, and significant modifications in the ownership 
structure of banks. We analyse the consequences of each type of instability for commercial and 
cooperative banks separately. We assess the influence of changes in the local bank presence on 
local economic activity and on the financial conditions of SMEs in a given county. With respect 
to local economic activity, we focus on unemployment growth and new firm creation, while 
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concerning SMEs’ outcomes; we focus on long-term debt growth, financial costs, and 
investments. Finally, we confront our research hypotheses, H1 to H4, with the empirical 
evidence. 
[Figure 1 here] 
3.4 Data Sources 
Our research project combines four data sources. The first dataset reports the address of 
all bank branches in Poland between 2008 and 2014, and we obtained it from an independent 
consulting company, Inteliace Research. This information allows us to track bank exits from 
and entries to counties, as well as the number of banks or branches operating in counties of 
Poland. Thus, this dataset is the basis for constructing all variables describing changes in the 
local bank presence between 2009 and 20142. To reflect local banking market instability better, 
we hand-collected information on ownership changes among commercial banks between 2009 
and 2014 (10 bank ownership changes involving 2.3 thousand branches in total) and among 
cooperative banks between 2010 and 2014 (13 bank ownership changes concerning 40 branches 
in total). Therefore, we were able to identify the number of banks and branches affected by 
ownership changes in individual counties. The county-level information is supplemented by a 
third dataset provided by the Polish Central Statistical Office describing the local economic 
condition, urbanization, human capital, and other traits of 380 counties3. The fourth and last 
dataset was obtained from the Amadeus database and includes firm-level information about 
Polish SMEs in individual counties between 2008 and 2014. We identified SMEs following the 
                                                 
2 We drop the observations form 2008 as we are able to calculate increases only starting from 2009. 
3 It should be noted that in our county-level regressions the number of counties drops to 379 because 
one county was created only in 2013. 
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definition of Eurostat4  and we excluded all companies that did not meet these criteria in at least 
one year within the analysed period. We also restricted our sample to companies from sections 
A-C and F-I of the NACE Rev. 2 industry classification. Therefore, we excluded the following 
sectors: financial institutions; utilities; industries dominated by the public sector; professional, 
scientific, technical, and administrative activities; and other industries that usually do not rely 
on bank loans as an important source of financing. We end up with a final sample of 
approximately 40 thousand companies5. 
3.5 Econometric Models 
3.5.1 Local Economic Condition 
To study the impact of banking market instability on the local economy, we estimate a 
set of panel estimation models using county-year observations. We regress local economic 
condition (COUNTY.DEP) against different measures of banking market instability (INSTB) 
and we could expect some feedback from COUNTY.DEP to INSTB, at least in case of some 
instability measures. In other words, we conjecture that banks could enter or exit from local 
markets if the local economic condition is good or poor, respectively. To address this potential 
endogeneity problem, we apply the GMM-SYS estimation procedure proposed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998). In contrast with other panel estimators (such as the fixed effects or random effects 
estimators), the GMM-SYS removes the strict exogeneity assumption for some regressors. This 
allows us to include in the regression analysis potentially endogenous variables, as well as the 
lagged dependent variable to control for the time persistence of local economic condition. We 
allow the lagged dependent variable to be only sequentially exogenous, while we assume that 
                                                 
4 Thus, SMEs are defined as employing fewer than 250 persons and having an annual turnover of as 
much as EUR 50 million, or a balance sheet total of no more than EUR 43 million. 
5 Exact numbers are given in tables 4, 6, 8, and 9 below the regression results. 
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endogeneity affects the increases in the number of bank branches in counties and bank 
entries/exits (variables: BANKS.INCR, BANKS.COOP.INCR and BANKS.CB.INCR; 
ENTRIES, COOP.ENTRIES, and CB.ENTRIES; EXITS, COOP.EXITS and CB.EXITS). On 
the other hand, we do not expect any feedback from local economic condition to bank 
ownership changes (variables: ACQ.BANK, ACQ.BANK.COOP, and ACQ.BANK.CB; 
ACQ.BRANCH, ACQ.BRANCH.COOP, and ACQ.BRANCH.CB) and we treat these 
variables as strictly exogenous. We justify our choice by the fact that, in our sample, ownership 
changes mostly affect commercial banks with nationwide presence; thus, the decisions 
regarding ownership changes should not be influenced by the economic situation of individual 
counties. The estimated county-level models are built according to the general principles 





where COUNTY.DEPkt denotes a dependent variable reflecting new firm creation 
(NEW.COMP) or unemployment rate growth (UNEMPL.INCR) in county k and year t; 
LOCAL.CTRLkt is a set of control variables describing banking market specificities (HHI and 
MAX.10.BANKS), human capital (GRADUATES), urbanization (POP.DENS), and the 
condition of local firms (MEAN.ROS and MEAN.SALES.GR) in county k and year t; INSTBkt-
1 is a set of banking market instability measures for county k and year t-1 designed to test our 
research hypotheses. Model (1) also includes dummies to control for specific conditions in each 
year. 
Simulations performed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
suggest that the asymptotic standard errors for the two-step estimator can be a poor guide to 
hypothesis testing, especially in the presence of heteroscedastic errors. Therefore, we base our 
statistical inference on the one-step estimator. We formally evaluate the appropriateness of the 
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set of instruments with the Hansen test, and we also check whether undesired instrument 
proliferation weakens the Hansen test, potentially generating the implausibly high p-value of 1 
(Roodman, 2006). 
Panels A and B in Table 1 specify the construction of all county-level dependent 
variables and control variables, as well as the regressors describing the local banking market 
instability. Panels A and B in Table 2 report the descriptive statistics for our final sample of 
county-year observations. 
[Table 1 here] 
[Table 2 here] 
3.5.2 Local Firms’ Outcomes 
To examine the impact of local banking market instability on already established SMEs, 
we apply the GMM-SYS procedure to dynamic panel models using a dataset composed of firm-

















where SME.DEPikt denotes long-term debt growth (DEBT.GR) and financial costs (FIN.COST) 
or investments (INVEST) of firm i, in county k in year t; SME.CTRLikt-1 is a set of control 
variables describing SMEs’ size (LNA), asset turnover (TAT), asset structure (CASH, 
COLLAT, FIXA), profitability (ROS, EBIT.S), and shareholders’ capital and leverage 
(EQUITY, LT.LIAB)6. LOCAL.CTRLkt and INSTBkt-1 are defined in the same way as in 
Equation (1). The model also includes dummies to control for specific conditions in different 
                                                 
6 Different firm-level controls are used in models explaining different dependent variables. See table 4 
for details. 
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years and industries.7 To test our research hypothesis regarding the impact of the local banking 
market instability on young companies (not more than 5 years old), we introduce binary 
variables identifying young companies (YOUNGitk) and their interaction terms with different 
market instability measures (YOUNGitk x INSTBitk-1). Panel C in Table 1 presents the detailed 
definitions of all firm-level variables, while Panel C in Table 2 reports the corresponding 
descriptive statistics. 
4 Results 
We organize the presentation of our research outcomes according to the type of 
modifications in the local bank presence, as described in the previous sections. Therefore, in 
sub-section 4.1, we concentrate on changes in the number of bank branches, in sub-section 4.2 
we focus on banks’ entries to and exits from local banking markets and, finally, in sub-section 
4.3, on the changes in the ownership structure of banks. Sub-section 4.4 constitutes the only 
exception to this rule, as in this sub-section we check the robustness of our findings in the case 
of relatively young local firms.  
4.1 Developments in Local Branch Networks 
Table 3 shows that changes in branch networks within counties affect the 
unemployment dynamics (specifications 1 and 2), but do not influence the creation of new 
companies (specifications 3 and 4). Regardless of the bank type, increases in the local presence 
are associated with positive tendencies on the labour market: the coefficients for the variables 
                                                 
7 While constructing industry dummies, we took into account the number of observations for each 
industry, and we grouped the industries into 17 groups. Each section of the NACE Rev 2 classification 
constitutes a separate industry bucket except for manufacturing, within which we identified 10 industry 
groups, and the wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, within which 
we identified two separate industry groups. 
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BRANCH. COOP.INCR and BRANCH.CB.INC in specification (2) are both negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. The identified relationships are 
also relevant in economic terms. Specification (2) implies that increases of one standard 
deviation in the number of cooperative and commercial bank branches lead to the reduction in 
the unemployment growth ratio by 11.3% and 38% of this growth ratio standard deviation, 
respectively. Therefore, our results support H1 with respect to the local labour market. 
County-level control variables influence the dependent variables predominantly in the 
expected directions, as shown in Table 3. The counties with a better-educated population 
(GRADUATES) are characterized by more favourable tendencies on the labour market 
(specification 1) and a more rapid pace of new firm creation (specification 3 and 4). Higher 
population density (POP.DENS) is positively related to start-up activity, while wide profit 
margins of local companies (MEAN.ROS) seem to be, at least partially, achieved through 
layoffs. The elevated local banking market concentration (HHI) inhibits new firm creation 
(specification 4) and, rather surprisingly, influences positively the county labour markets. 
[Table 3 here] 
In Table 4, we report how changes in local bank branch networks affect the performance 
of SMEs. In contrast with H1, the studied factor is almost irrelevant to SMEs’ outcomes. We 
obtain only weak evidence that an increase in the presence of cooperative banks within counties 
is favourable for SMEs’ access to debt and investment. Namely, the coefficients for the variable 
BRANCH.COOP.INCR are positive and significant in specifications (2) and (6), but only at 
the 10% level. Moreover, the impact of cooperative bank branch network development is only 
moderately significant in economic terms. Specifications (2) and (6) indicate that the rise in the 
number of cooperative bank branches by one standard deviation in the same county where an 
SME is established results in the long term debt and tangible fixed assets growth ratios higher 
by 0.1 and 0.4 of a percentage point, respectively. 
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Firm-level control variables mostly impact the dependent variables in the predictable 
directions, as reported in Table 4. The large size of operations (LNA), significant cash holdings 
(CASH), and more rapid asset turnover (TAT) seem related to a quicker pace of long-term debt 
growth, lower financial costs, and higher investments. Firms that already possess a significant 
long-term debt (LT.LIAB) record its slower growth rates and invest less. A solid equity capital 
base (EQUITY) improves the terms of debt contracting, while sizeable fixed assets (FIX.A) 
restrain investments. Good sales profitability (ROS or EBIT.S) facilitate long-term debt growth 
and investments. However, unexpectedly, high returns on sales ratios are positively associated 
with higher SMEs’ financial costs.  
[Table 4 here] 
In sum, we believe that the positive relationship between local bank branch development 
and county labour markets reflects the direct impact of this type of change in local bank 
presence on local economic situation through the influence of new jobs creation. There are three 
reasons behind our conclusion. First and most importantly, Table 4 provides only weak 
evidence that the modifications in local bank branch networks affect SMEs’ performance. 
Second, as Table 3 documents, a larger number of branches do not translate into higher start-
up activity. Third, as shown in Table 3, we obtain negative and statistically significant 
coefficients in the regressions explaining the unemployment dynamic for both cooperative 
banks (BRANCH.COOP.INCR) and commercial banks with nationwide branch networks 
(BRANCH.OHTER.INCR). Therefore, the impact of branch network development does not 
depend on the banking model and the kind of information processed. Due to the size of their 
operation, cooperative banks rely more on soft information and relationship banking, while all 
branching commercial banks are large, distantly managed organizations mainly employing a 
transaction approach in lending and hard information. Under the hypothesis that changes in 
local bank branch networks affect unemployment indirectly, through the conditions of local 
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firms, we should witness a positive and higher impact of cooperative banks expansion on the 
local labour market compared to commercial banks. However, this does not seem to be the case 
in our study.  
4.2 Banks Entries to and Exits from Local Markets 
In this sub-section, we investigate the consequences of banks’ entries to and exits from 
local markets. Table 5 reports the results of the county-level analysis and Table 6 presents the 
outcomes of the firm-level analysis. In line with the findings reported in Table 3, we establish 
that changes in the number of banks influence unemployment growth, but do not affect new 
firm creation. Specifications (2) and (10) in Table 5 suggest that the situation of the local labour 
market is more favourable when the number of cooperative banks increases, while it worsens 
when cooperative banks withdraw from a given county. However, as specification (6) indicates, 
entries of commercial banks with nationwide branch networks also limit the unemployment 
growth ratios. The effects of banks entries and exits are relevant in economic terms. For 
example, specification (2) shows that the increase by one in the number of cooperative banks 
within a county causes a reduction in the unemployment growth ratio by 24.8% of its standard 
deviation. The entry of a commercial bank in a county, according to specification (6), induces 
a similar modification in the values of the UNEMP.INCR variable. The consequences of a 
cooperative bank exit are even more significant: specification (10) documents that this change 
is linked to a surge in the unemployment growth ratio of 104.5% of its standard deviation. 
[Table 5 here] 
At the firm level, our investigation reveals the most stable and significant empirical 
patterns in the analysis of financial costs incurred by SMEs. We find that increases in the 
number of banks, and entries of banks into local banking markets in particular, lower the costs 
of contracting bank debt, in line with Rice and Strahan (2010). The coefficient for the variable 
BANKS.INCR in specification (3) and the variable ENTRIES in specification (9) are both 
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negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, specifications (4) and (10) 
document that the influence of an increase in the number of banks on the FIN.COST variable 
is stronger for commercial banks with nationwide presence than for cooperative banks. 
Specification (4) implies that the presence of one more cooperative bank and one more 
commercial bank in a county is associated with the reduction in the financial costs of an SME 
by 1% and 2% of the FIN.COST variable median in the sample, respectively. We conjecture 
that entries of large banks exert pressure on all banks present in a county to diminish their 
lending spreads. Concerning long-term debt growth ratios, specification (8) suggests that entries 
of cooperative banks are beneficial to SMEs. At the same time, specifications (2) and (8) show 
that a stronger position for large commercial banks worsens SMEs’ access to bank lending. Our 
evidence remains in line with the literature, documenting that small banks possess a 
comparative advantage over large banks in lending to SMEs (Berger and Udell, 2002; Berger 
et al., 2005; Berger et al., 2015a; DeYoung, 2002) However, the modifications in the value of 
the DEBT. GR variable are modest. The entry of a cooperative bank engenders an increase in 
the long-term debt growth ratio equal to 0.2% of the DEBT.GR variable standard deviation, 
while the entry of a commercial bank induces a change in the opposite direction equal to 0.3% 
of the standard deviation. Investment activities remain largely unaffected by banks’ entries to 
and exits from local markets. Only specification (18) provides weak evidence that the exit of 
cooperative banks may reduce SMEs’ investment.  
[Table 6 here] 
The empirical evidence reported in Tables 5 and 6 support, at least to some extent, H2 
and the existing evidence for the Polish market (Hasan et al., 2014). We show that changes that 
favour the application of the relationship banking model and the use of soft information in the 
lending process are beneficial to the local economy. The increase in the number of cooperative 
banks reduces unemployment growth and stimulates long-term growth for SMEs. In contrast, 
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exits of cooperative banks are linked to the worsening of the local labour market and lower 
investments of SMEs. In addition, a rise in the number of cooperative banks weakly lowers the 
financial costs reported by SMEs. 
4.3 Changes in the Ownership Structure of Banks 
Variations in the ownership structure of banks represent the third and final source of the 
instability in local banking markets that we analyse. Table 7 presents the results at the county 
level, while Table 8 reports the regressions’ outcomes at the firm level. In contrast with sub-
sections 4.1 and 4.2, the studied factor does not seem to affect unemployment growth ratios, 
but it influences the pace of new firm creation, as in study by Black and Strahan (2002). 
According to specifications (3) and (7) in Table 7, the relatively high number of banks acquired 
by new entities is positively and significantly correlated with the NEW.COMP variable, at the 
1% level. Contrary to the results reported by Peek and Rosengren (1995) and Strahan and 
Weston (1998), specifications (4) and (8) suggest that this relationship is only driven by 
ownership changes in the group of commercial banks, characterized by nationwide branch 
networks. Specification (4) implies that, if a new owner acquires one of the commercial banks 
operating in a given country, this leads to an increase in the pace of new firm creation equivalent 
to 7.4% of the NEW.COMP variable standard deviation. Due to the post-crisis period 
specificity, we are inclined to explain the regularities identified in Table 7 by the fact that new 
owners of non-cooperative large banks are usually financially stronger and pursue more 
aggressive market strategies than their predecessors. As a consequence, commercial banks after 
fundamental changes in ownership structures became more willing to finance new firm 
creation. An alternative explanation relies on shifts in the lending behaviour of competitors 
within the same market, as suggested by Berger et al. (1998). 
[Table 7 here] 
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The results on SMEs’ performance reported in Table 8 are either statistically not 
significant or ambiguous. The growth of long-term debt and investments of SMEs are not 
influenced by changes in the ownership structure of cooperative and commercial banks. The 
findings regarding the determinants of financial costs reported by SMEs are method sensitive. 
When we consider the number of banks affected by ownership changes, the coefficients for the 
variables illustrating the instability within local markets (ACQ.BANK and ACQ.BANK.CB) 
are positive and significant. However, when we base our inferences on the number of bank 
branches affected by ownership changes, the coefficients for the ACQ.BRANCH and 
ACQ.BRANCH.CB variables become negative and significant. We offer two explanations for 
the puzzling results reported in Table 8. First, the changes in ownership structures not only 
imply the arrival of new stronger owners, but also cause modifications in lending policies, 
which, in turn, may lead to distortions in banks’ relations with customers. Therefore, the 
positive and negative (from the perspective of SMEs) effects of ownership changes in banks 
already present in local markets may offset each other. Second, the indicators of the instability 
caused by changes in ownership structures based on the number of branches exhibit, as Panel 
B in Table 2 documents, much more variability than the indicators relying on the numbers of 
banks. This difference may be responsible for the contradicting results concerning the 
determinants of SMEs’ financial costs. In sum, we obtain weak evidence in favour of H3 
because such proof only relates to one aspect of the local economic situation: the pace of new 
firm creation. 
[Table 8 here] 
4.4 Changes in the Bank Local Presence and Firms’ Age 
Young firms usually have a smaller scale of operations and are more informationally 
opaque than mature companies. Therefore, young SMEs are more dependent on bank lending 
for financing investment projects and current activities. Moreover, banks are reluctant to lend 
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to young SMEs because they can only show short credit histories and are frequently unable to 
pledge valuable collateral. Even when a new firm manages to establish a relationship with a 
bank, which helps overcome the problems related to the asymmetric information, strengthening 
this relationship requires a considerable time. As a consequence, from a theoretical perspective, 
young SMEs’ outcomes should be more sensitive to changes in the local bank presence 
compared to other firms.  
In Table 9, we verify whether the positive and negative effects of instability within a 
county banking market are magnified in the case of young firms. To test H4, we introduce a 
binary variable, YOUNG, which identifies SMEs founded no more than 5 years ago, and we 
interact this variable with all previously used variables illustrating changes in the local bank 
presence. Our findings support H4 in the case of SMEs’ long-term debt growth (Panel A in 
Table 9) and financial costs (Panel B in Table 9). In contrast, there is no evidence (Panel C in 
Table 9) that investments of young SMEs are more vulnerable to instability in local banking 
markets than mature firms. 
As expected, young companies record faster growth of long-term debt, incur higher 
financial costs, and invest more. The coefficients for the variable YOUNG are all positive in 
Table 9 and mostly statistically significant at the 1% level. Specifications (1) and (3) confirm 
that the reinforcement of cooperative banks local presence improves SMEs’ access to bank 
lending. In contrast, specification (3) suggests that entries of commercial banks are negatively 
correlated with long-term debt growth ratios of SMEs, in line with the findings reported in 
Table 6. Therefore, specifications (1) and (3) provide additional evidence supporting H2. The 
negative impact of an increase in the number of commercial banks within a county banking 
market is particularly pronounced—in line with H4—for young firms: the coefficients of the 
relevant interaction terms are negative and statistically significant in specifications (2) and (3).  
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Panel B in Table 9 allows us to refine the conclusions formulated in sub-section 4.2. 
Increases in the number of commercial banks or entries of such banks lower the financial costs 
for all SMEs (specifications 8 and 9), while increases in the number of cooperative banks or 
their entries only influence the dependent variable FIN.COST in the case of young firms. The 
results for ownership changes (specifications 11 and 12) remain ambiguous and method 
sensitive, as in sub-section 4.3. With regard to the investment activities of SMEs, Panel C in 
Table 9 provides only weak evidence (specification 16) that the exit of cooperative banks affects 
investments negatively and exits of commercial banks impact them positively. The age of the 
firms does not seem to modify the relationship between changes in the local bank presence and 
SMEs’ investments, as all interaction terms in Panel C are statistically insignificant.  
[Table 9 here] 
5 Concluding Remarks 
In our study, we examined whether the instability of local banking markets influences 
local economic activity. The empirical evidence on Poland showed that selected changes in the 
local bank presence constitute an independent factor that affects local economic activity after 
controlling for its persistence, macroeconomic tendencies, banking market characteristics, 
demographic situation, industry specifics, firm-level factors, and factors related to local human 
capital.  
We find that the situation of the local labour market is, on the one hand, positively 
affected by an increase in the number of commercial and cooperative bank branches, a rise in 
the number of cooperative banks, and entries of commercial banks. On the other hand, it seems 
negatively influenced by the exists of cooperative banks. The impact of these factors on the 
local labour market is most probably direct and is exerted through job creation, not through the 
condition of local firms. In contrast, the pace of new firm creation is dependent only on the 
appearance of new owners for locally present commercial banks. Our evidence suggests that 
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the acquisition of commercial banks by usually stronger and more aggressive new owners after 
the 2008 crisis has facilitated the creation of new local firms. 
With regard to SMEs’ access to bank debt, we obtain evidence in line with the findings 
of DeYoung (2002) and Berger at al. (2015a). In particular, we establish that the strengthening 
of the cooperative banks’ positions (the increases in the number of cooperative bank branches 
and entries of those banks into counties) are positively related to the long-term debt growth 
ratios reported by SMEs. Conversely, the rise in the number of commercial banks or entries of 
those banks inhibit long-term debt growth. Our research outcomes appear to support the view 
that local bank organizations, applying the relationship banking model and using soft 
information, have a comparative advantage over large nationwide banks in satisfying the 
financing needs of local companies.  
The increased competition, due to rising numbers of local players, seems to lower the 
financial costs incurred by SMEs. However, the evidence on the relation between changes in 
bank ownership structures and financial costs reported by local firms is inconclusive and 
method-sensitive. The influence of changes in the local bank presence is the weakest in the case 
of SME investment. We obtained only weak evidence that the increase in the number of 
cooperative bank branches favour investment, while the exits of cooperative banks act in the 
opposite direction. 
Our study suggests some policy implications. First, policy-makers and regulatory bodies 
should not only consider nationwide consequences, but they may also focus on local effects 
when making decisions that influence the structure of the banking system. Second, small local 
banks seem to play an important and positive role in shaping local economic activity and the 
performance of local firms. Therefore, the regulatory approach to this kind of banking 
organizations should support them and help them preserve their financial soundness. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions 
Panel A. County-level dependent and control variables 
UNEMPL Unemployment rate 
UNEMPL.INCR Year-to-year growth in the unemployment rate 
NEW.COMP The number of new companies registered in a given year divided 
by a county’s population (per 100 people) 
HHI Local banking market’s concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index, where the number of a bank’s local branches denotes its 
significance)  
MAX.10.BANKS A binary variable that takes the value of 1 for counties with no 
more than 10 banks operating in their area, and 0 otherwise 
GRADUATES People graduating from universities in a given year divided by a 
county’s population (per 100 people) 
POP.DENS Population density (in hundreds per 1 km2) 
MEAN.ROS Mean return on sales of SMEs located in a county 
MEAN.SALES.GR Mean growth rate of sales of SMEs located in a county 




Year-to-year percentage increase in the number of all bank 
branches, cooperative bank branches, and commercial bank 





Year-to-year increase in the number of banks, cooperative banks, 






The number of all banks, cooperative banks, and commercial 
banks, respectively, which opened their first branch in a given 





The number of all banks, cooperative banks, and commercial 
banks, respectively, which closed all their branches in a given 





The number of banks, cooperative banks, and commercial banks, 
respectively, which operated in a given county and were acquired 





The number of branches of all banks, cooperative banks, and 
commercial banks, respectively, which operated in a given county 
and were acquired by other entities in a given year 
 
Panel C. SMEs’ characteristics 
DEBT.GR Yearly increase in bank and long-term debt to total assets at the beginning of a 
year in constant prices 
FIN.COST Financial expenses to average assets per year 
INVEST Growth rate of tangible fixed assets at constant prices 
LNA Natural logarithm of total assets at constant prices  
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CASH Ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total assets 
TAT Ratio of sales to total assets 
COLLAT Ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets, i.e. the share of assets that can be 
easily used as loan collateral 
ROS Gross profit/loss to sales 
LT.LIAB Ratio of non-current liabilities to total assets 
EQUITY Ratio of shareholders’ funds to total assets 
EBIT.S Operating profit/loss to sales 
FIXA Ratio of fixed assets to total assets 
YOUNG A binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is not more than 5 years old, 
and 0 otherwise 
*To eliminate the effect of bank mergers, banks merging in period t are already treated as a single 
institution in year t-1, while calculating the growth rate of bank numbers and the number of bank 
exits/entries in year t. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 Obs. Counties Mean Median St. dev. 5th perc. 25th perc. 75th perc. 95th perc. 
Panel A. County-level dependent and control variables* 
UNEMPL 1,893 379 0.156 0.147 0.061 0.067 0.110 0.198 0.267 
UNEMPL.INCR 1,893 379 -0.002 0.001 0.015 -0.031 -0.010 0.008 0.018 
NEW.COMP 1,893 379 0.836 0.794 0.262 0.526 0.668 0.949 1.284 
HHI 1,893 379 0.155 0.135 0.085 0.063 0.094 0.189 0.329 
MAX.10.BANKS 1,893 379 0.331 0 0.471 0 0 1 1 
GRADUATES 1,893 379 0.486 0 1.250 0 0 0.231 2.969 
POP.DENS 1,893 379 3.792 0.900 6.754 0.360 0.610 1.860 20.310 
MEAN.ROS 1,893 379 0.026 0.027 0.036 -0.027 0.007 0.044 0.078 
MEAN.SALES.GR 1,893 379 0.037 0.035 0.070 -0.071 -0.008 0.078 0.154 
Panel B. Variables describing instability of a banking market in a county* 
BRANCH.INCR 1,893 379 0.029 0 0.101 -0.111 -0.030 0.077 0.205 
BRANCH.COOP.INCR 1,865 374 0.051 0 0.325 -0.125 0 0.071 0.333 
BRANCH.CB.INCR 1,874 377 0.050 0 0.214 -0.167 -0.043 0.100 0.333 
BANKS.INCR 1,893 379 0.582 0 1.121 -1 0 1 3 
BANKS.COOP.INCR 1,893 379 0.060 0 0.417 0 0 0 1 
BANKS.CB.INCR 1,893 379 0.522 0 1.057 -1 0 1 2 
ENTRIES 1,893 379 0.958 1 0.995 0 0 2 3 
COOP.ENTRIES 1,893 379 0.115 0 0.368 0 0 0 1 
CB.ENTRIES 1,893 379 0.843 1 0.928 0 0 1 3 
EXITS 1,893 379 0.365 0 0.586 0 0 1 1 
COOP.EXITS 1,893 379 0.055 0 0.245 0 0 0 1 
CB.EXITS 1,893 379 0.310 0 0.540 0 0 1 1 
ACQ.BANK 1,514 379 0.664 1 0.703 0 0 1 2 
ACQ.BANK.COOP 1,514 379 0.007 0 0.085 0 0 0 0 
ACQ.BANK.CB 1,893 379 0.615 1 0.668 0 0 1 2 
ACQ.BRANCH 1,514 379 1.336 1 3.844 0 0 1 5 
ACQ.BRANCH.COOP 1,514 379 0.014 0 0.210 0 0 0 0 
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ACQ.BRANCH.CB 1,893 379 1.202 1 3.531 0 0 1 4.4 
Panel C. SMEs’ characteristics** 
DEBT.GR 154,399 41,733 0.5% 0.0% 11.1% -11.6% -1.8% 0.2% 16.8% 
FIN.COST 132,655 37,933 2.2% 1.4% 2.8% 0.1% 0.5% 2.9% 6.9% 
INVEST 148,389 40,231 9.0% -5.8% 85.6% -52.9% -17.3% 6.4% 110.8% 
LNA 154,399 41,733 10.467 10.484 1.467 8.034 9.505 11.479 12.836 
CASH 152,007 41,190 13.4% 6.3% 17.1% 0.2% 1.7% 18.5% 51.2% 
TAT 152,789 41,306 228.5% 188.1% 172.5% 25.5% 109.6% 301.4% 585.2% 
COLLAT 152,000 41,112 29.3% 23.5% 25.3% 0.4% 6.5% 46.9% 78.2% 
ROS 151,795 41,101 2.8% 2.5% 18.1% -16.5% 0.2% 7.5% 24.1% 
LT.LIAB 153,896 41,588 8.3% 0.8% 15.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.2% 40.4% 
EQUITY 144,016 39,175 52.0% 51.8% 26.1% 9.6% 31.0% 73.5% 93.5% 
EBIT.S 152,002 41,166 3.6% 3.2% 17.7% -14.6% 0.6% 8.1% 25.1% 
FIXA 154,285 41,711 32.9% 28.1% 26.4% 0.8% 9.2% 51.9% 83.0% 
DEBT.GR 154,399 41,733 0.5% 0.0% 11.1% -11.6% -1.8% 0.2% 16.8% 
FIN.COST 132,655 37,933 2.2% 1.4% 2.8% 0.1% 0.5% 2.9% 6.9% 
INVEST 148,389 40,231 9.0% -5.8% 85.6% -52.9% -17.3% 6.4% 110.8% 
LNA 154,399 41,733 10.467 10.484 1.467 8.034 9.505 11.479 12.836 
CASH 152,007 41,190 13.4% 6.3% 17.1% 0.2% 1.7% 18.5% 51.2% 
YOUNG 154,399 41,733 0.094 0 0.292 0 0 0 1 
* Based on firm-year observations used in the estimation of specification 1 in Table 3. 
** Based on firm-year observations used in the estimation of specification 1 in Table 4. 
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Table 3. Impact of increases in the number of bank branches on counties 
This table presents the results of the GMM-SYS model estimations. For the sake of brevity, 
year dummies’ coefficients are not reported. The variables describing instability of the local 
banking market are treated as endogenous. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 UNEMPL.INCRt UNEMPL.INCRt NEW.COMPt NEW.COMPt 
UNEMPL.INCRt-1 -0.188 -0.0609   
 (0.190) (0.0378)   
NEW.COMPt-1   0.117 0.151 
   (0.178) (0.131) 
HHIt -0.0195*** -0.0209** 0.0130 -0.345** 
 (0.00696) (0.00893) (0.400) (0.136) 
MAX.10.BANKSt 0.00176 0.00219* -0.0385 -0.00301 
 (0.00108) (0.00128) (0.0333) (0.0150) 
GRADUATESt -0.000633** -0.000382 0.0535*** 0.0447*** 
 (0.000286) (0.000248) (0.0146) (0.0115) 
POP.DENSt 6.03e-05 4.97e-05 0.00430* 0.00435* 
 (5.27e-05) (6.96e-05) (0.00237) (0.00223) 
MEAN.ROSt 0.0228** 0.0193** -0.356* -0.242 
 (0.00970) (0.00893) (0.200) (0.165) 
MEAN.SALES.GRt -0.00421 -0.00535 0.149 0.0353 
 (0.00454) (0.00484) (0.134) (0.0455) 
BRANCH.INCRt-1 -0.0611***  -0.233  
 (0.0178)  (0.319)  
BRANCH.COOP.INC
Rt-1  -0.00521*  0.0101 
  (0.00306)  (0.0386) 
BRANCH.CB.INCRt-1  -0.0267**  -0.145 
  (0.0130)  (0.104) 
Constant -0.0229*** 0.0105*** 0.682*** 0.853*** 
 (0.00112) (0.00241) (0.147) (0.128) 
Observations 1,893 1,846 1,893 1,846 
Number of counties 379 372 379 372 
Hansen 14.12 20.60 8.680 21.97 
Hansen (p-value)  0.167 0.300 0.563 0.233 
Note: *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
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Table 4. Impact of increases in the number of bank branches on SMEs 
This table presents the results of the GMM-SYS model estimations. For the sake of brevity, the coefficients of county-level control variables ((HHI, 
MAX.10.BANKS, GRADUATES, POP.DENS, UNEMPL), year dummies, and industry dummies are not reported.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DEBT.GRt DEBT.GRt FIN.COSTt FIN.COSTt INVESTt INVESTt 
DEBT.GRt-1 -0.0410*** -0.0404***     
 (0.00591) (0.00596)     
FIN.COSTt-1   0.272*** 0.254***   
   (0.0739) (0.0728)   
INVESTt-1     0.0314*** 0.0310*** 
     (0.00403) (0.00404) 
LNAt 0.0115*** 0.0115*** -0.00134*** -0.00134*** 0.0848*** 0.0853*** 
 (0.000282) (0.000283) (0.000100) (0.000101) (0.00210) (0.00211) 
CASHt-1 0.0117*** 0.0112*** -0.00421*** -0.00410*** 0.260*** 0.263*** 
 (0.00217) (0.00216) (0.000695) (0.000696) (0.0263) (0.0265) 
TATt-1 0.00694*** 0.00691*** -0.000679*** -0.000672*** 0.0212*** 0.0213*** 
 (0.000261) (0.000260) (7.47e-05) (7.41e-05) (0.00220) (0.00222) 
COLLATt-1 -0.00149 -0.00178 0.000103 6.26e-05   
 (0.00185) (0.00185) (0.000355) (0.000359)   
ROSt-1 0.00957*** 0.00931*** 0.00370*** 0.00356***   
 (0.00241) (0.00241) (0.00107) (0.00107)   
LT.LIABt-1 -0.128*** -0.127***   -0.130*** -0.128*** 
 (0.00416) (0.00413)   (0.0193) (0.0195) 
EQUITYt-1   -0.0197*** -0.0203***   
   (0.00200) (0.00197)   
EBIT.St-1     0.0622*** 0.0611*** 
     (0.0169) (0.0171) 
FIX.At-1     -0.632*** -0.634*** 
     (0.0154) (0.0155) 
BRANCH.INCRt-1 0.00342  0.000218  0.00815  
 (0.00412)  (0.000824)  (0.0296)  
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BRANCH.COOP.INCRt-1  0.00183*  -9.75e-06  0.0129* 
  (0.00106)  (0.000237)  (0.00751) 
BRANCH.CB.INCRt-1  0.000858  -0.000672  -0.0172 
  (0.00228)  (0.000424)  (0.0156) 
Constant -0.126*** -0.125*** 0.0376*** 0.0395*** -0.623*** -0.616*** 
 (0.00392) (0.00395) (0.00320) (0.00372) (0.0296) (0.0303) 
Observations 154,399 152,711 119,353 118,004 146,113 144,508 
Number of firms 41,733 41,309 34,396 34,039 39,569 39,163 
Hansen 16.84 17.00 1.021 0.476 16.33 15.57 
Hansen (p-value) 0.207 0.199 0.312 0.490 0.232 0.273 
Note: *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 5. Impact of bank entries/exits on counties 
This table presents the results of the GMM-SYS model estimations. The set of unreported 
explanatory variables includes year dummies, industry dummies, and county-level controls 
(HHI, MAX.10.BANKS, GRADUATES, POP.DENS, MEAN.ROS, MEAN.SALES.GR, and 
a lagged dependent variable). The variables describing instability of the local banking market 
are treated as endogenous. 
 UNEMPL.INCRt UNEMPL.INCRt NEW.COMPt NEW.COMPt 
Panel A. Increases in the number of banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BANKS.INCRt-1 -0.00151  -0.0318  
 (0.00124)  (0.0291)  
BANKS.COOP.INCRt
-1  -0.00373**  0.0132 
  (0.00189)  (0.0405) 
BANKS.CB.INCRt-1  -0.00181  -0.0337 
  (0.00120)  (0.0259) 
Observations 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 
Number of counties 379 379 379 379 
Hansen 14.80 21.43 11.71 21.58 
Hansen (p-value) 0.140 0.258 0.305 0.251 
Panel B. Bank entries 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ENTRIESt-1 0.00586  -0.0537  
 (0.00422)  (0.103)  
COOP.ENTRIESt-1  -0.00293  -0.0317 
  (0.00350)  (0.0873) 
CB.ENTRIESt-1  -0.00396**  0.0705 
  (0.00182)  (0.0787) 
Observations 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 
Number of counties 379 379 379 379 
Hansen 5.112 25.94 11.75 9.555 
Hansen (p-value) 0.646 0.101 0.109 0.215 
Panel C. Bank exits 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
EXITSt-1 -0.000712   -0.0688   
 (0.00473)   (0.0836)   
COOP.EXITSt-1  0.0157*  -0.0939 
  (0.00853)  (0.128) 
CB.EXITSt-1  -0.00209  0.0830 
   (0.00445)   (0.0952) 
Observations 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 
Number of counties 379 379 379 379 
Hansen 13.45 25.34 6.905 11.75 
Hansen (p-value) 0.200 0.116 0.734 0.860 
Note: *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 6. Impact of bank entries/exits on SMEs 
This table presents the results of the GMM-SYS model estimations. The set of unreported explanatory variables includes county-level controls 
(HHI, MAX.10.BANKS, GRADUATES, POP.DENS, and UNEMPL), year dummies, industry dummies, a lagged dependent variable, and other 
firm-level controls, i.e.: (a) LNA, CASH, TAT, COLLAT, ROS, LT.LIAB, in the case of specifications 1-2, 7-8 and 13-14; (b) LNA, CASH, TAT, 
COLLAT, ROS, EQUITY, in the case of specifications 3-4, 9-10 and 15-16; (c) LNA, CASH, TAT, LT.LIAB, EBIT.S, FIX.A, in the case of 
specifications 5-6, 11-12 and 17-18. All firm-level control variables, except for LNA, were lagged by one period. 
 DEBT.GRt DEBT.GRt FIN.COSTt FIN.COSTt INVESTt INVESTt 
Panel A. Increases in the number of banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BANKS.INCRt-1 -0.000349  -0.000246***  -0.000318  
 (0.000274)  (5.65e-05)  (0.00212)  
BANKS.COOP.INCRt-1  0.000442  -0.000148*  0.00332 
  (0.000442)  (8.58e-05)  (0.00372) 
BANKS.CB.INCRt-1  -0.000678**  -0.000286***  -0.00179 
  (0.000325)  (6.71e-05)  (0.00248) 
Observations 154,399 154,399 119,353 119,353 146,113 146,113 
Number of firms 41,733 41,733 34,396 34,396 39,569 39,569 
Hansen 16.82 16.84 0.965 0.986 16.34 16.34 
Hansen (p-value) 0.208 0.207 0.326 0.321 0.231 0.231 
Panel B. Bank entries 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
ENTRIESt-1 -0.000361  -0.000325***  0.000176  
 (0.000308)  (6.74e-05)  (0.00238)  
COOP.ENTRIESt-1  0.000783*  -8.80e-05  0.000361 
  (0.000475)  (9.28e-05)  (0.00399) 
CB.ENTRIESt-1  -0.000991**  -0.000454***  8.10e-05 
  (0.000396)  (8.65e-05)  (0.00303) 
Observations 154,399 154,399 119,353 119,353 146,113 146,113 
Number of firms 41,733 41,733 34,396 34,396 39,569 39,569 
Hansen 16.82 16.87 1.064 1.055 16.33 16.33 
Hansen (p-value) 0.207 0.205 0.302 0.304 0.232 0.232 
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Panel C. Bank exits 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
EXITSt-1 8.25e-05  -2.06e-05  0.000791  
 (0.000449)  (8.63e-05)  (0.00349)  
COOP.EXITSt-1  0.000313  9.24e-05  -0.0104* 
  (0.000719)  (0.000140)  (0.00613) 
CB.EXITSt-1  -2.71e-05  -7.47e-05  0.00604 
   (0.000559)   (0.000109)   (0.00419) 
Observations 154,399 154,399 119,353 119,353 146,113 146,113 
Number of firms 41,733 41,733 34,396 34,396 39,569 39,569 
Hansen 16.83 16.83 1.028 1.000 16.33 16.27 
Hansen (p-value) 0.207 0.207 0.311 0.317 0.232 0.235 
Note: *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
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Table 7. Impact of changes in bank ownership on counties 
This table presents the results of the GMM-SYS model estimations. The set of unreported 
explanatory variables includes year dummies, industry dummies, and county-level controls 
(HHI, MAX.10.BANKS, GRADUATES, POP.DENS, MEAN.ROS, MEAN.SALES.GR, and 
a lagged dependent variable). The variables describing instability of the local banking market 
are treated as exogenous. 
 UNEMPL.INCRt UNEMPL.INCRt NEW.COMPt NEW.COMPt 
Panel A. Ownership changes measured at the bank level 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ACQ.BANKt-1 -0.00372  0.0193***   
 (0.00343)  (0.00648)   
ACQ.BANK.COOPt-1  -0.00210  0.0185 
  (0.00838)  (0.0264) 
ACQ.BANK.CBt-1  -0.00373  0.0193*** 
  (0.00345)  (0.00652) 
Observations 1,514 1,514 1,514 1,514 
Number of counties 379 379 379 379 
Hansen 3.555 3.593 3.356 3.356 
Hansen (p-value) 0.169 0.166 0.187 0.187 
Panel B. Ownership changes measured at the branch level 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ACQ.BRANCHt-1 2.33e-05  0.00619***  
 (5.60e-05)  (0.00107)  
ACQ.BRANCH.COOPt-1  -0.000533  -0.000564 
  (0.000954)  (0.00837) 
ACQ.BRANCH.CBt-1  2.59e-05  0.00622*** 
  (5.70e-05)  (0.00109) 
Observations 1,514 1,514 1,514 1,514 
Number of counties 379 379 379 379 
Hansen 3.021 3.075 3.577 3.538 
Hansen (p-value) 0.221 0.215 0.167 0.171 
Note: *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 8. Impact of changes in bank ownership on SMEs 
This table presents the results of the GMM-SYS model estimations. The set of unreported explanatory variables includes county-level controls 
(HHI, MAX.10.BANKS, GRADUATES, POP.DENS, and UNEMPL), year dummies, industry dummies, a lagged dependent variable, and other 
firm-level controls, i.e.: (a) LNA, CASH, TAT, COLLAT, ROS, LT.LIAB, in the case of specifications 1-2 and 7-8; (b) LNA, CASH, TAT, 
COLLAT, ROS, EQUITY, in the case of specifications 3-4 and 9-10; (c) LNA, CASH, TAT, LT.LIAB, EBIT.S, FIX.A, in the case of specifications 
5-6, 11-12. All firm-level control variables, except for LNA, were lagged by one period. 
 DEBT.GRt DEBT.GRt FIN.COSTt FIN.COSTt INVESTt INVESTt 
Panel A. Ownership changes measured at the bank level  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ACQ.BANKt-1 0.000273  0.000400***  -0.00207  
 (0.000716)  (0.000134)  (0.00528)  
ACQ.BANK.COOPt-1  0.000331  0.00118  2.26e-05 
  (0.00401)  (0.000790)  (0.0331) 
ACQ.BANK.CBt-1  0.000272  0.000376***  -0.00213 
  (0.000726)  (0.000136)  (0.00536) 
Observations 124,214 124,214 95,939 95,939 117,366 117,366 
Number of firms 40,558 40,558 32,928 32,928 38,358 38,358 
Hansen 16.72 16.72 0.805 0.791 14.07 14.07 
Hansen (p-value) 0.160 0.160 0.370 0.374 0.297 0.296 
Panel B. Ownership changes measured at the branch level 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
ACQ.BRANCHt-1 -3.67e-06  -5.03e-05***  3.63e-05  
 (2.95e-05)  (8.54e-06)  (0.000266)  
ACQ.BRANCH.COOPt-1  8.63e-05  0.000323  -0.00306 
  (0.00218)  (0.000311)  (0.0144) 
ACQ.BRANCH.CBt-1  -3.69e-06  -5.04e-05***  3.68e-05 
  (2.95e-05)  (8.55e-06)  (0.000266) 
Observations 124,214 124,214 95,939 95,939 117,366 117,366 
Number of firms 40,558 40,558 32,928 32,928 38,358 38,358 
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Hansen 16.71 16.71 0.849 0.837 14.06 14.06 
Hansen (p-value) 0.161 0.161 0.357 0.360 0.297 0.297 
Note: *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 9. Impact of banking market instability on young SMEs 
This table presents the results of the GMM-SYS model estimations. The set of unreported explanatory variables includes county-level controls 
(HHI, MAX.10.BANKS, GRADUATES, POP.DENS, and UNEMPL), year dummies, industry dummies, a lagged dependent variable, and other 
firm-level controls, i.e.: (a) LNA, CASH, TAT, COLLAT, ROS, LT.LIAB, in the case of specifications 1-6; (b) LNA, CASH, TAT, COLLAT, 
ROS, EQUITY, in the case of specifications 7-12; (c) LNA, CASH, TAT, LT.LIAB, EBIT.S, FIX.A, in the case of specifications 13-18. YOUNG 
is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is not more than 5 years old, and 0 otherwise. All firm-level control variables, except for LNA, 
were lagged by one period. 
Panel A. Impact on debt growth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DEBT.GRt DEBT.GRt DEBT.GRt DEBT.GRt DEBT.GRt DEBT.GRt 
Def. of INSTB.COOP: BRANCH.COOP.INCR BANKS.COOP.INCR COOP.ENTRIES COOP.EXITS ACQ.BANK.COOP ACQ.BRANCH.COOP 
Def. of INSTB.CB: BRANCH.CB.INCR BANKS.CB.INC CB.ENTRIES CB.EXITS ACQ.BANK.CB ACQ.BRANCH.CB 
YOUNGt 0.0146*** 0.0158*** 0.0178*** 0.0142*** 0.0189*** 0.0169*** 
 (0.00145) (0.00170) (0.00222) (0.00166) (0.00324) (0.00188) 
INSTB.COOPt-1 0.00215** 0.000446 0.000858* 0.000588 0.00133 0.000404 
 (0.00109) (0.000452) (0.000482) (0.000738) (0.00404) (0.00221) 
INSTB.CBt-1 0.00100 -0.000432 -0.000663* -9.21e-05 0.000463 7.91e-06 
 (0.00227) (0.000329) (0.000398) (0.000571) (0.000729) (3.04e-05) 
YOUNGt x INSTB.COOPt-1 -0.00462 -0.000366 -0.00107 -0.00297 -0.0102 -0.00452 
 (0.00416) (0.00157) (0.00157) (0.00289) (0.0196) (0.0125) 
YOUNGt x INSTB.CBt-1 -0.000897 -0.00282** -0.00353** 0.000957 -0.00265 -0.000116* 
 (0.0124) (0.00136) (0.00166) (0.00247) (0.00215) (7.01e-05) 
Observations 152,706 154,394 154,394 154,394 124,210 124,210 
Number of firms 41,308 41,732 41,732 41,732 40,557 40,557 
Hansen 17.50 17.43 17.44 17.36 17.29 17.25 
Hansen (p-value) 0.178 0.181 0.180 0.183 0.139 0.140 
 
Panel B. Impact on financial costs 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 FIN.COSTt FIN.COSTt FIN.COSTt FIN.COSTt FIN.COSTt FIN.COSTt 
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Def. of INSTB.COOP: BRANCH.COOP.INCR BANKS.COOP.INCR COOP.ENTRIES COOP.EXITS ACQ.BANK.COOP ACQ.BRANCH.COOP 
Def. of INSTB.CB: BRANCH.CB.INCR BANKS.CB.INC CB.ENTRIES CB.EXITS ACQ.BANK.CB ACQ.BRANCH.CB 
YOUNGt 0.000893*** 0.00120*** 0.00136*** 0.000771** 0.000898 0.00124*** 
 (0.000328) (0.000342) (0.000453) (0.000336) (0.000631) (0.000389) 
INSTB.COOPt-1 0.000137 -8.17e-05 -9.00e-06 0.000157 0.00115 0.000269 
 (0.000224) (8.70e-05) (9.42e-05) (0.000143) (0.000782) (0.000304) 
INSTB.CBt-1 -0.000810* -0.000272*** -0.000448*** -0.000104 0.000388*** -4.57e-05*** 
 (0.000414) (6.71e-05) (8.65e-05) (0.000111) (0.000137) (8.65e-06) 
YOUNGt x INSTB.COOPt-1 -0.00230 -0.000981*** -0.00118*** -0.000919 0.000545 0.00128 
 (0.00158) (0.000332) (0.000321) (0.000633) (0.00478) (0.00254) 
YOUNGt x INSTB.CBt-1 0.00232 -0.000166 -5.14e-05 0.000393 -0.000172 -5.08e-05*** 
 (0.00253) (0.000275) (0.000352) (0.000485) (0.000433) (1.72e-05) 
Observations 117,999 119,348 119,348 119,348 95,935 95,935 
Number of firms 34,038 34,395 34,395 34,395 32,927 32,927 
Hansen 0.519 1.075 1.070 1.014 0.837 0.897 
Hansen (p-value) 0.471 0.300 0.301 0.314 0.360 0.344 
 
Panel C. Impact on investments 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 INVESTt INVESTt INVESTt INVESTt INVESTt INVESTt 
Def. of INSTB.COOP: BRANCH.COOP.INCR BANKS.COOP.INCR COOP.ENTRIES COOP.EXITS ACQ.BANK.COOP ACQ.BRANCH.COOP 
Def. of INSTB.CB: BRANCH.CB.INCR BANKS.CB.INC CB.ENTRIES CB.EXITS ACQ.BANK.CB ACQ.BRANCH.CB 
YOUNGt 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.151*** 0.159*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0155) (0.0197) (0.0147) (0.0278) (0.0169) 
INSTB.COOPt-1 0.0117 0.00365 7.56e-05 -0.0128** -0.00847 -0.00317 
 (0.00768) (0.00371) (0.00397) (0.00614) (0.0305) (0.0137) 
INSTB.CBt-1 -0.0161 -0.00208 0.000244 0.00767* -0.00280 1.16e-06 
 (0.0156) (0.00247) (0.00299) (0.00421) (0.00530) (0.000266) 
YOUNGt x INSTB.COOPt-1 0.0211 -0.00912 0.00177 0.0433 0.158 0.0232 
 (0.0356) (0.0173) (0.0172) (0.0335) (0.258) (0.149) 
YOUNGt x INSTB.CBt-1 -0.00349 0.00427 -7.68e-05 -0.0201 0.00807 0.000272 
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 (0.0918) (0.0119) (0.0141) (0.0220) (0.0200) (0.000830) 
Observations 144,503 146,108 146,108 146,108 117,362 117,362 
Number of firms 39,162 39,568 39,568 39,568 38,357 38,357 
Hansen 15.11 15.72 15.71 15.76 14.93 14.85 
Hansen (p-value) 0.301 0.265 0.265 0.262 0.245 0.250 
Note: *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
